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19 August 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 August 1960

### **DAILY BRIEF**

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*Republic of the Congo: UN forces in the Congo have reportedly been authorized to shoot in their own defense following new anti-Western and anti-white incidents which were apparently instigated by Lumumba. On 18 August, a Canadian officer of the UN force was injured and other Canadians subjected to indignities by Force Publique soldiers at the Leopold-ville airport. US Ambassador Timberlake--who was barred by Congolese soldiers from Lumumba's residence on 18 August-warns that the Force Publique could be incited to action against the UN troops, or to new depredations against whites in general.

Secretary General Hammarskjold, meanwhile, has stated that he will invite any nation in the Security Council which disagrees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its views, possibly in the form of a resolution. He appears confident that a critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the two Communist nations. The British, meanwhile, are exploring means of averting a showdown between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, believing that UN operations could not continue in the face of a determined Congolese demand for withdrawal.

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		III. THE WEST	2	25X
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· 	1
:		ny - Cuba: Following the breakd ons between Cuba and the Feder		
	believes that the	Castro regime may extend diplo	matic recognition	
	to East Germany,	Paul Verner, a high-ranking cial now in Havana, could be the	East German Com-0 K-	
	tempt to get the C	Cubans to accept establishment i	n Havana of a con-	
	sulate general, a	nd West Germany is trying to bl	ock such action.	
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West Germany: Foreign Minister Brentano has stressed to Ambassador Dowling that it is essential to equip NATO forces with medium-range nuclear missiles, and that this whole question must be discussed "calmly and earnestly" by NATO members as soon as practicable next spring. This may indicate that the Bonn cabinet has accepted Defense Minister Strauss' reported view that West German forces should be equipped with Polaris missiles.

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# IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Main Trends in Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965.

Annex B, Tables of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Strengths and Characteristics of Selected Weapons and Equipment. NIE 11-4-60. 16 August 1960.

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### LATE ITEMS

\*South Korea: The House of Representatives on 19 August, by a vote of 117-107 with one abstention, approved the nomination of Chang Myon as prime minister. Chang has indicated he will appoint a cabinet broadly representative of all Democratic party groups, in an attempt to bridge the intraparty breach between his supporters and those of Kim To-yun, the first nominee for the premiership. The government also may include one or more OK independents. The near-even strength of Chang and his opponents suggests that the new government, which is subject to a simple majority of the powerful lower house, might be shortlived. The balance of power between the feuding Democratic factions appears to rest with a combination of the 40-odd independents in the house. However, Chang's constitutional authority to dissolve the house and call new elections after a vote of no confidence may have a restraining influence on the members, who

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X Approved For Relaise 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A095200430001-6 presumably would be reluctant to face elections again so 25X soon. \*Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane is urgently 25X1 trying to arrange some understanding with General Phoumi in Savannakhet to avert possible civil war. Souvanna is bitter over King Savang's attitude in withholding royal sanction for his government, thus undercutting its authority. In contrast to Souvanna's anxiety, Phoumi seems increasingly confident over prospects for his counterrevolutionary effort, [and is refusing to make any settlement until rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le relinquishes control of Vientiane. Phoumi is proceeding with deployment of troops around Vientiane, and anticipates that this pressure, combined with stepped-up psychological warfare operations, will frighten the capital into submission. 25X


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DAILY BRIEF

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Premier Lumumba's fulminations against Secretary General Hammarskjold and against non-African contingents of the UN occupying force have led to new anti-Western and anti-white incidents in Leopoldville. On 18 August, a Canadian officer was clubbed and other Canadians forced to lie down and be searched by members of Lumumba's Force Publique during a "security check" at Leopoldville airport. UN troops were subsequently authorized to shoot if necessary in their own defense. On the same day, US Ambassador Timberlake was barred by Congolese soldiers from entering Lumumba's residence.

Ambassador Timberlake observed on 17 August that the physical presence of a UN force in the Congo was by itself insufficient to maintain order. He reported that "thousands" of armed and undisciplined Force Publique soldiers were still at large in the Congo and that the situation had become critical in Leopoldville, where such units had come under the personal authority of Lumumba. He added that the Force Publique could be incited to action against the UN troops or even against whites in general.

Lumumba's most recent anti-UN proclamations have coincided with seemingly stepped-up bloc and Communist activity in the Congo.

At the same time, members of the Czech delegation to the In-

At the same time, members of the Czech delegation to the International Labor Organization in Geneva stated that Prague was prepared to assist the Congo "in all possible ways," including personnel, materiel, and finances. The Czech interior minister had stated on 13 August that Prague was sending the Congo "immediate" aid worth about \$300,000

In New York, Secretary General Hammarskjold has stated that he will invite any nation in the Security Council which

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disagrees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its views, possibly in the form of a resolution. He appears confident that a critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the two Communist members.

Concerning a possible UN withdrawal from the Congo, Hammarskjold professed to regard such a demand by Lumumba as unlikely. He expressed the conviction that Lumumba is being advised by Communists in Leopoldville, but stated that he could see no alternative to Lumumba at this time.

PER DULL I THE LEG COST I I I
The British Foreign Office is exploring means of averting
a showdown between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, believing
that the UN operations could not continue in the face of a deter-
mined Congolese demand for withdrawal. The preliminary
British views are that the best way of supporting the UN effort
would be by tackling the constitutional dispute between Lumum-
ba and Tshombé, perhaps by having the UN Security Council
appoint a committee of three African nations to seek to resolve
the issue. 7

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### Bonn Anticipates Cuban Recognition of East Germany

Bonn believes that the Castro regime may extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany. Paul Verner, a high-ranking East German Communist party official now in Havana attending a Cuban Communist party congress, could be the vehicle to get the Cubans to allow his government to establish a consulate general in Havana, and West Germany is trying to block such action.

In view of the breakdown on 5 August of West German - Cuban trade negotiations, Bonn has little bargaining power. It hopes, however, to persuade the Cubans to do no more than the UAR, which in September 1959 permitted the establishment of an East German Consulate General in Cairo but issued a public statement denying that this action constituted diplomatic recognition. East Germany now is recognized only by Yugoslavia and the bloc countries.

Cuban recognition could lead to a rupture of ties with West Germany. Bonn's policy--known as the 'Hallstein doctrine''-- calls for breaking off diplomatic relations with any country other than the USSR that recognizes the Ulbricht regime.

The trend toward closer Cuban economic and political ties with the bloc, which has developed at an increasingly rapid pace since the Cuban-Soviet trade and assistance agreements were signed last February, suggests that recognition of East Germany, with which Cuba already has economic agreements, could come at any time. Antonio Nunez Jimenez, executive secretary of Cuba's powerful Agrarian Reform Institute, went to East Germany as head of an economic mission early last month. During the visit he made a formal address at Humboldt University, saying: "We have declared that we desire diplomatic relations, not only with the Soviet Union, but with all socialist countries."

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Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A0052004\( \beta 0001-6 \) West Germans Indicate Desire for Polaris Missiles West German Foreign Minister Brentano has stressed to Ambassador Dowling that NATO forces must be equipped with medium-range nuclear missiles. Commenting that MRBMs now mean what machine guns meant in World War I, Brentano told Dowling they are fundamental to European defense, and that this is the vital NATO question which should be discussed with the new US administration as soon as practicable next spring. Dowling surmises that Brentano's comments indicate cabinet acceptance of the position reportedly taken by Defense Minister Strauss that German forces should be equipped with Polaris missiles. Publicly the West Germans have maintained that they have not asked for MRBMs, and that NATO rather than Bonn must decide whether to accept the American offer of such weapons to NATO. On 17 August, Bonn rejected a Soviet protest made on 19 July against alleged plans to equip the West German Army with Polaris missiles.

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Situation in Laos

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Premier Souvanna Phouma has sent emissaries to General Phoumi at his Savannakhet headquarters in south-central Laos in an urgent effort to reach some understanding that would avert civil war. Discussing the situation with Ambassador Brown on 18 August, Souvanna said: "Phoumi should know that there are no Communists or Pathet Lao in my government." Souvanna complained of lack of help in his efforts to avoid bloodshed, and was particularly critical of King Savang's refusal to sanction his government. Souvanna indicated he felt the King's pose as a "prisoner" of troops in Luang Prabang loyal to General Phoumi was contrived.

creasingly confident over prospects for his counterrevolutionary		
campaign. Phoumi continues to retain the loyalty of all military com-	•	
mands with the exception of Vientiane,		
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While willing to negotiate with the Souvanna Phouma government, Phoumi refuses to come to any settlement until Kong Le withdraws his troops from Vientiane. Kong Le ostensibly has turned over authority to the new government, but his troops still control the town, and Premier Souvanna admits that "no one is technically in charge" at this time.

General Phoumi says he is proceeding with deployment of troops around Vientiane, but does not intend to attack the capital. He feels this pressure, combined with propaganda leaflet drops and other psychological warfare measures, will be sufficient to frighten the capital into submission. However, he apparently is determined to push the issue, since he feels a protracted stalemate could be readily exploited by the Pathet Lao dissidents.

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The situation in Vientiane is generally calm, and international air flights were resumed, at least temporarily, on 18 August. There is imminent danger, however, of flooding by the Mekong River, swollen by heavy rains. Because of this threat and the unsettled political situation, dependents of American personnel in the town were evacuated to Thailand on 19 August

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### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

**National Indications Center** 

The Director

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